Mueller v. Allen produced a new theory — neutrality — destined to become a hallmark of Supreme Court religion clause jurisprudence. The Court held that Minnesota parents could deduct expenses for tuition, textbook costs, and transportation for their children regardless of the type of school they attended.
Because the statute was blind — the basis of the neutrality principle — to the kinds of schools attended, the statute did not impermissibly aid religion. It made no difference that more than 90 percent of the benefits passed to students attending religious schools. Aguilar v. In a vote, the Court struck down the program because the teachers might be tempted to inject religious instruction in a pervasively religious environment. Twelve years later, in Agostini v.
Felton , the Court overruled its decision in Aguilar and in doing so altered the Lemon test. The Court extended the neutrality principle in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District , which held that a school district did not violate the establishment clause by furnishing a sign-language interpreter to a Catholic high school student under a federally funded program.
Mitchell v. Simmons-Harris , which dealt with the constitutionality of voucher programs. Under an Ohio program, parents of students could receive a voucher to send their child to a school of their choice. Indeed, the metaphor is rarely to be found any longer in Supreme Court opinions. Tax Commission , which expresses the view that the appropriate role of the government toward religion is neither hostility nor active support.
This article was originally published in Derek H. Davis is the former director of the J. He now practices law in Dallas, Texas. He is the author or editor of nineteen books and has also published more than articles in various journals and periodicals. He serves numerous organizations given to the protection of religious freedom in American and international contexts. Alley, Robert S. Amherst, N. Miller, Robert T. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, Witte, John.
Boulder, Colo. Aid to Parochial Schools [electronic resource]. Other articles in Issues Related to Religion. Want to support the Free Speech Center? Donate Now. Felton Aguilar v. Felton Benevolent Neutrality Board of Education v. Allen Child Benefit Theory Cochran v. But court interpretations have not always been consistent when it comes to indirect aid. Today, the law remains unclear about the constitutionality of some government aid to students attending religious schools.
In , the U. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment's establishment of religion clause did not allow federal and state governments to "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Board of Education.
These include government-funded bus transportation and non-religious textbooks for students enrolled in parochial religious schools. In , the Supreme Court decided that it violated the establishment clause for a state to help pay salaries of Catholic school instructors who taught secular non-religious subjects like math and science.
In this case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court reasoned that, when the state paid the salaries, the Catholic Church could use the savings to pay for its purely religious purposes.
Thus, the state ended up aiding a religion. In the Lemon case, the Supreme Court formulated guidelines for determining when an act of government violated the establishment clause. According to the so-called "Lemon test," any government act involving religion must meet all three of the following requirements to be constitutional under the First Amendment:. The result of the government act must not excessively entangle government with the affairs of religion.
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided federal funds for remedial teaching of educationally deprived children from low-income families. This funding was made available to help students in both public and private schools, including those operated by religions. To satisfy the First Amendment's establishment clause, Congress required that all funds go to public school systems, which would then be responsible for remedial instruction in both public and parochial schools. Starting in , New York City set up remedial reading, math, and other services at parochial schools.
About 20, disadvantaged students, most enrolled in Catholic schools, were served by the federal Title I program. All Title I teachers and other educational professionals worked for public schools and volunteered for extra duty and pay at parochial schools. Teachers were told not to include any religious instruction in their teaching even though they would be working in parochial schools.
They were to avoid all unnecessary contact with the regular parochial school staff. The public school system supplied all teaching materials. Even religious symbols were removed from Title I classrooms. Finally, Title I teachers were monitored by public school supervisors, who conducted at least one unannounced classroom visit per month. The purpose of this monitoring was to ensure that the federally funded remedial teaching did not aid religion.
Twelve years after the Title I program began in New York City parochial schools, a group of taxpayers filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming that the use of tax money for this purpose violated the First Amendment's establishment clause. The case, Aguilar v. Felton, reached the Supreme Court in The court ruled, 5—4, that New York's Title I remedial program in parochial schools failed to pass the third part of the Lemon test and therefore was an establishment of religion.
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan stated that the need to monitor public school remedial teachers to make sure no religious instruction was taking place "inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state. Writing in dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor argued that there was no reason to even have such a monitoring system. In her opinion, professional public school teachers would hardly start teaching religion simply because they were working for an hour or so in parochial school classrooms.
To try to satisfy the Supreme Court's decision in the Aguilar case, the New York City Board of Education provided remedial instruction to parochial students in classrooms separated from their schools. Most often, this involved marching students to a mobile instructional vehicle parked outside the school.
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